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Abstract: A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution 
system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic dc-voltage-source in the loop. 
Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the 
communication is over a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). 
Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense method that exposes active 
attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leak) does not function 
here. The attack is successfully demonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.  
Keywords: KLJN key exchange; unconditional security; ground loop vulnerability; passive 
attack. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 On secure communications 
 Communications systems, standards and technologies have been developed since ancient history. 
Today we have the internet, Internet-of-Things (IoT), the operating 4th generation wireless networks 
(LTE), and the expected 5th generation wireless networks. An important requirement of any 
communication paradigm between these devices is to accomplish the communication securely. That 
is, to protect the privacy and integrity of the users’ data that is transferred over the network. To 
achieve the security of the transferred data that can contain sensitive information (e.g., bank 
account credentials, social security number, etc.) it is of utmost importance to defend against 
attacks. These attacks might be launched by an eavesdropper (Eve) who has access to the 
information channel between the communicating parties A (Alice) and B (Bob). The attack is 
passive if it is an eavesdropping without disturbing the channel. The attack is active (invasive) if 
Eve disturbs or changes the channel, such as during the man-in-the-middle attack. In the present 
paper, we introduce a new passive attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme. 
 
1.1.1 Secure key exchange 
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 Secure communication systems employ ciphers to encrypt the message (plaintext) and to decrypt 
the encrypted message (cyphertext). While the creation of a secure and efficient cipher is a complex 
problem; this problem is basically solved. The ciphers operate with secure keys that form a 
momentary shared secret between Alice and Bob. Sharing (exchanging) the key securely is the 
difficult task. A communicator system cannot be more secure than its key. The security of the key 
exchange can be conditional or information-theoretic (unconditional). 
 
 
1.1.2 Conditional security 
Conditionally secure key exchange systems are the ones used generally nowadays. They are 
software protocols installed at Alice and Bob. Such algorithms utilize computational complexity 
and achieve only (computationally-) conditional security, see, e.g [1,2]. The system is temporarily 
secure provided the adversary has limited computational resources. A major goal of quantum 
computer developments is to crack these types of key exchange systems (e.g. Shor algorithm). From 
an information-theoretic point of view, the security is non-existent because Eve has all the 
information to crack the encryption but she needs a long time to do that, unless she has a quantum 
computer or a yet-to-be-discovered classical algorithm that can do the job in a short time. The 
security is not future-proof. 
 
 
1.1.2 Unconditional (information-theoretic) security 
In order to achieve unconditional (information-theoretic) security at the key exchange, proper laws 
of physics with a special hardware are utilized. Two major classes of physics-based schemes have 
emerged for unconditional security:  
i) Quantum key distribution (QKD) [3,4], concepts assume single photons and utilize quantum 
physics. The underlying laws of physics are Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the related 
quantum no cloning theorem [5]. Even though there are serious debates about the actual level of 
unconditional security a practical QKD can offer (see, e.g. [6-29]), most scientists agree that QKD is 
unique by offering information-theoretic security via (a dark) optical fiber, and also through air, 
during nights, provided the visibility is good. 
ii) The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution method that is a based on the statistical 
physical features of the thermal noise of resistors [30-52]. The related law of physics is the 
fluctuation-dissipation-theorem (FDT). Some of its advantages are: it works via wire connections 
including power, phone and internet lines, which can be used as information channel [31, 32] to 
connect all the homes and the other establishments. It can be integrated on a chip, which implies 
excellent robustness, low price and applicability in bankcards, computers, instruments and physical 
unclonable function (PUF) hardware keys [33, 34]. Its low price allows general applications such as 
unconditional security for the control of autonomous vehicular networks [35, 36]. 
 
 
1.2 On the KLJN secure key distribution 
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The KLJN scheme [30-52] utilizes the thermal noise of resistors (or the emulation of that by a 
specific hardware). In the core scheme Alice and Bob have two identical pairs of resistors  RL  and 
 RH  ( RL < RH ) , respectively, see Fig. 1.  
The key exchange protocol of a single secure bit is as follows: Alice and Bob randomly pick one of 
their resistors ( RL  or  RH ), connect it to the wire channel, and keep them there during the bit 
exchange period while they execute voltage and/or current measurements to learn the resistor value 
at the other end, see below.  
The noise voltage generators shown in Fig. 1 with each resistor can be the resistors' own thermal 
noise, or an external noise generator emulating a much higher, common noise-temperature that is 
publicly agreed. The power density spectra of the voltage and current in the channel are given by 
the by the Johnson-Nyquist formulas [11] :  
 
 
Su ( f ) =
4kTRΑRΒ
RΑ + RΒ
         (1) 
 
Si ( f ) =
4kT
RA + RB
   ,      (2) 
 
where k is the Boltzmann’s constant, T is the common temperature,  RA  and BR  are the 
actually connected resistances at Alice’s and Bob’s ends, respectively,  RA , RB ∈ RL , RH{ } . After the 
measurement and spectral analysis, Equations (1) and (2) have two unknown variables, the values 
of  RA  and BR  , thus Eve can find the values of the connected resistors, but no necessarily their 
locations, by solving these equations.  
We can represent the 4 different situations of the connected resistors ( RL  and/or  RH ) at Alice's 
and Bob's ends by the indices of the connected resistors, LL, LH, HL, and HH, respectively. As all 
the resistors have the same (noise) temperature, the ideal system is in thermal equilibrium where 
the 2nd law of thermodynamics guarantees zero net power-flow. Hence, Eve cannot use the 
evaluation of power flow to determine the locations of the momentarily connected resistors unless 
they have the same resistance values. On the other hand, Alice and Bob can determine the 
connected resistor values by Equations (1) or (2) since they know the value of their own connected 
resistors. When  RA = RB , which happens at 50% of the bit exchange attempts, the results are 
discarded.  
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Figure 1. The core of the KLJN system.  UHAn (t) ,  ULAn (t) ,  UHBn (t)  and  ULBn (t)  are the 
(thermal) noise voltage generators for the related resistances.  U (t)  and  I (t)  are the measured 
noise voltage and the current in the wire that are used to evaluate the power density spectra  Su ( f )  
and  Si ( f ) , respectively. 
 
 
1.2.1 On former attacks against the KLJN secure key distribution 
Several attacks have been proposed but no attack has been able to compromise the unconditional 
security of the KLJN scheme because each known attack can efficiently be nullified by a 
corresponding defense scheme.  
The attacks can be categorized into two classes: 
i) Passive attacks that utilize the non-ideal or parasitic features in a practical KLJN system for 
information leak. Non-zero wire resistance, see in [37], [38] poses the most known threat and the 
most efficient attack is power balance measurement (Second Law Attack) [39]. An efficient defense 
is based on a proper temperature-offset [39, 40]. Temperature-inaccuracies [41] and 
resistance-inaccuracies [42] can also cause information leak. On the other hand, these inaccuracies 
can compensate each other out [43] if used in a creative way. Non-zero cable capacitance [44] or 
cable inductance can also yield information leak that can be fixed by specific design including the 
proper choice of the frequency range and privacy amplification. Transients can also be utilized for 
attack [45] but there are various ways of defenses [46, 47]. The newest KLJN system, the 
random-resistor-random-temperature (RRRT-KLJN) scheme [48] is robust against the above 
vulnerabilities; at least, no known attack exists against it yet.  
ii) Active attacks, where Eve either modifies the information channel or she injects an extra current 
into that. Current injection attack [30, 49] and the man-in-the-attack [50] are the explored examples 
[2006]. Due to the current and voltage comparison [50] feature and its more advanced 
cable-modeling version [49], active attacks are, so far, the least efficient attacks against the KLJN 
scheme. 
iii) Flawed attacks. There are some proposed attack methods that are based on misconceptions and 
they do not work. See their brief summary and their criticism, for example, in papers [51-55] and 
book [56]. 
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2. The new attack scheme utilizing deterministic loop currents 
 
2.1 The situation that Eve’s utilizes for the attack 
In practical KLJN systems, in order to save a wire, the common end of the resistors (see Fig. 1) is 
often connected to the ground. At practical situations, there is often an imbalance, a voltage 
difference between various locations of the ground; for example due to ground loop currents or 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) [53]. This potential information leak was pointed out in [53] as 
the potential source of information leak in the case of significant cable resistance. However, it has 
not been realized in [53] that information leak can exist even at zero cable resistance. 
  
In this paper, we explore this new information leak in the DC parasitic voltage limit. Thus the 
considerations hold for situations where during the bit exchange period, the relative change of the 
parasitic voltage is small. For the sake of simplicity but without the limitation of generality, we 
assume that the imperfection is represented by a positive DC voltage generator located at Alice’s 
end, see Fig. 2.  
Due to Kerckhoffs's principle of security, that is, the assumption that the enemy knows everything 
except momentary key, we must assume that Eve knows the polarity and value of this DC voltage. 
(If she does not know it at the beginning, she will be able to extract it by a long-time averaging). The 
direction of the current I(t) is assumed to point from Alice to Bob. The voltage U(t) and current I(t) 
in the wire contain the sum of a DC and an AC (stochastic, that is, noise) components. 
 
 
Figure 2. The KLJN system with ground loop voltage. Here  UAn ∈{ULAn;UHAn}  and  UBn ∈{ULBn;UHBn} , 
are the voltage noises belonging to the randomly chosen resistors,  RA & RB ∈{RL; RH} , of Alice and 
Bob, respectively.  UDC  is the ground loop DC voltage source and  U (t)  &  I (t) are the voltage and 
current on the wire, respectively. 
 
Let us analyze the resulting voltages and currents. The current in the wire is: 
  I (t) = IDC + In (t)            (3) 
where  IDC  is its DC component  
DC
DC
A B
UI
R R
=
+
      (4) 
 6 of 13 
and  In (t)  is its AC (noise) component 
An Bn
n
A B
( ) ( )( ) U t U tI t
R R
−=
+
 ,          (5) 
 
where AnU  and BnU  , with  UAn ∈{ULAn;UHAn}  and  UBn ∈{ULBn;UHBn} , are the voltage noise 
sources of the chosen resistors, AR  and BR , respectively.  
 
The voltage on the wire is: 
                   U (t) = I (t)RB +UBn (t)           (6) 
From Equations 3 and 6 we obtain 
                   U (t) =UDCw +UACw (t) = IDCRB + In (t)RB +UBn (t)          (7) 
where  UDCw and  UACw (t)  represent the DC and AC voltage components in the wire, respectively. 
The DC component can be written as: 
                       
 
UDCw = IDCRB =
UDC
RA + RB
RB          (8) 
  
 
The DC component is different during Alice's and Bob's LH and HL bit situations of secure bit 
exchange, which yields information leak. In the LH situation, that is, when  RA = RL and B HR R= , 
the DC component of the voltage on the wire is 
                    
UDCw ≡ULH =U DC
RH
RH + RL
,        (9) 
and, in the HL bit situation: 
                   
 
UDCw ≡UHL =   UDC
RL
RH + RL
.       (10) 
Note, as we have been assuming that in the given KLJN setup RH > RL , in this particular situation                                
     UHL <ULH                              (11) 
For later usage, we evaluate the average of  ULH  and  UHL , and call this quantity threshold voltage, 
 U th , where: 
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U th =
ULH +UHL
2
=
UDC
2
        (12) 
The effective (RMS) amplitude  UACw  of the noise voltage on the wire is identical in both the LH 
and HL cases: 
                    L HACw
L H
4 W
R RU kTB
R R
=
+
 .            (13) 
 
Note, the voltage and current noises in the wire follow normal distribution since the addition of 
normally distributed signals result in a signal that has normal (Gaussian) distribution with a 
corresponding mean (see Equation 10) and variance.  
 
For an illustration of the information leak, see Figure 3. The DC component, that is, the mean value 
of the resulting (AC+DC) Gaussian depends on the bit situation during secure key exchange. This 
dependence poses as a source of information for Eve about the secret key. This feature will be 
exploited below for the new attack scheme. 
 
 
2.2 The attack scheme 
The attack consists of three steps: measurement, evaluation, and guessing.  
 
i) Measurement: During a single secure bit exchange, Eve measures N independent samples of the 
wire voltage.  
 
ii) Evaluation: She evaluates the fraction γ  of these N samples that are above  U th : 
                 
 
γ = N
+
N
  ,               (14) 
where  N +  is the number of samples that are above  U th .   
 
iii) Guessing (based on Equations 9-14): For  0.5 < γ  and  γ < 0.5 , Eve's guesses are the  LH  and 
 HL bit situations, respectively. For  γ = 0.5   her decision is undetermined and carries no useful 
information. 
 
iv) Eve's correct guessing probability p is given as: 
                               
 
p = lim
ntot→∞
 
ncor
ntot
 ,         (15) 
where  ntot  is the total number of guess bits and  ncor  is the number of correctly guessed bits. The 
situation  p = 0.5  indicates perfect security against Eve's attack. 
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In the next section, we demonstrate the attack method by computer simulations. 
 
 
          Figure 3. Eves' threshold scheme to guess the bit situation LH vs HL. 
 
3. Simulation Results 
To test Eve's correct guessing probability  p  for the LH situation. We assumed that Alice and Bob 
selected  RL = 1 kΩ  and  RH = 10 kΩ . During these experiments, the DC voltage was kept at a 
constant level of 0.1 V (see Figures 2 and 3). To generate the noise, we used the white Gaussian 
noise function (wgn) from the communication system toolbox of Matlab to test the success statistics 
of the attack scheme while varying the temperature.  The effective bandwidth  Δ f  and the range 
of temperatures were 1 MHz and  108 < T <1018  K , respectively. At the lower temperatures  p  
was 1 within the statistical inaccuracy of simulations and at the high-temperature limit it converged 
to 0.5. The duration of the secure bit exchange period was characterized by the number N of 
independent noise samples used during the exchange of the particular bit.  
 
We tested secure key length M =700 bits at different bit exchange durations represented by 
sample/bit numbers N = 1000, 500 and 200, respectively. Figure 4 shows Eve's correct guessing 
probability ( p ) of a key bit vs. temperature. With temperature approaching infinity, the effective 
noise voltage on the wire is also approaching infinity and the Gaussian density function will be 
symmetrically distributed around the threshold voltage  U th . Thus the probabilities of finding the 
noise amplitude above or below  U th  are identical (0.5) Then Eve's correct guessing probability of 
represents the perfect security limit,  p = 0.5 .   
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Figure 4.  Eve's correct guessing probability (p) of key bits vs. temperature at bandwidth  Δ f = 106 
Hz, for key length 700 bits, and duration/bit (number of samples/bit) 200, 500 and 1000, 
respectively. The limit p=0.5 stands for perfect security. 
 
The observed dependence can be interpreted by the behavior of the error function (see also 
Equations 8 and 12): 
 
p U t( ) ≥U th{ } = 0.5 1− erf U th −UDCwUeff
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 , (16) 
where ( )U t is the instantaneous voltage amplitude in the wire and the error function is: 
 
erf (x) = 1
π
exp− y
2
− x
x
∫ dy      (17) 
The noise in the KLJN scheme is a bandlimited white noise thus, in accordance with the Johnson 
formula, the effective noise voltage scales as: 
 
 Ueff ∝ T  Δ f .        (18) 
 
Therefore, when the temperature T is converging to infinity, p is converging to the perfect security 
limit of 0.5, see Figure 4. 
 
 
4. Some of the possible defense techniques against the attack  
Based on the considerations above, the impact of the attack can be eliminated by various means. 
The most natural ways are:  
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i) Cancelling the effect of the DC-Voltage sources. For example, Bob can put a variable DC source 
that compensates its effect. Similarly, eliminating ground loops is also beneficial.  
ii) Alice and Bob can increase the effective temperature, that is the amplitudes of their noise 
generators, see Equation 18 and Figure 4. 
iii) Alice and Bob can increase the bandwidth to increase the effective value of the noise, see 
Equations 18 and 20. However, the bandwidth must stay below the wave limit [54] to avoid 
information leak due to reflection thus the applicability of this tool is strongly limited. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The KLJN secure key exchange scheme is a statistical physical system that offers unconditional 
(information-theoretic) security. For a detailed survey and its history, see a recent book [56]. 
In this paper a novel attack against the KLJN protocol is shown that uses a frequently occurring 
parasitic feature, namely the imbalance of voltages between the ground points at the two ends.  
We showed that such parasite voltages and currents could cause information leak. The attack was 
demonstrated by computer simulations and proper defense protocols were shown to eliminate the 
information leak. The considerations in this introductory paper about this new attack type are valid 
in the limit when the parasitic voltage is static or its (possible) time-dependence is slow compared 
to the dynamics of the noise. Work is in hand to explore more complex situations, too. 
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